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A CASE IN POINT
EDWARD GOLDSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1979, President Carter signed into law the Trade
Agreements Act of 19791 (the Act) which approves and implements
the several trade agreements negotiated during the Tokyo Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Tokyo Round).2 The Tokyo
Rounds was the seventh in a series of multinational trade negotia-
tions' conducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).5 Unlike the previous rounds of the
' General Counsel of the Consumer Electronics Group, GTE Products Corp. Member
of the Industry Sector Advisory Committee on Electronics and Instrumentation, United
States Department of Commerce (1980). B.S., in B.A., LL.B., Boston University, 1966.
Member of the Massachusetts and New York Bars.
Act of July 26, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.).
* Id., § 2 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2503); see Hederman, Revised U.S. Trade Laws
and How They Can Affect Your Clients, in DoING BUSINESS AFTER THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 3 (1979).
3 Although the Tokyo Round negotiations were actually conducted in Geneva, the dis-
cussions were labelled the "Tokyo Round" because they were opened by the Declaration of
Ministers meeting at Tokyo in September of 1973. See General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade: Tokyo Declaration on Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Press Rel. GATT/
1134 (Sept. 14, 1973), reprinted in 12 IN'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1533 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Tokyo Declaration].
4 Previous rounds of GATT negotiations were held in: Geneva, Switzerland, 1947; An-
necy, France, 1949; Torquay, England, 1951; Geneva, Switzerland, 1955-1956; Geneva, Swit-
zerland, 1960-1962; Geneva, Switzerland, 1964-1967. K. DAM, THE GATT - LAW AND INTER-
NATIONAL EcONOWC ORGANIZATION 56 (1976).
5 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 22, 1947, 61
Stat. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT], sought to raise
standards of living, assure full employment, increase the growth of real income and effective
demand, and to expand the production of goods. These objectives were to be achieved
through "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce." GATT, supra, preamble. See Graham, Revolution in
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GATT negotiations,6 the Tokyo Round was aimed at reducing and
eliminating nontariff barriers7 to international trade.8 One of the
major nontariff barriers which has hindered the integration of
world trade and the fostering of political and economic cooperation
among nations has been discrimination against foreign products
and suppliers by government procuring entities.9 While such dis-
crimination was not prohibited in the original GATT treaty,10 the
Tokyo Round negotiators took a significant step toward eliminat-
ing discriminatory government purchasing by approving the Agree-
ment on Government Procurement (the Agreement).1 Designed to
afford foreign products and suppliers "treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to domestic products and suppliers," 2 the
Agreement is likely to produce the dual effect of expanding United
States exports while increasing the risks of injury to domestic busi-
ness created by aggressive foreign suppliers Who previously could
not compete.13
With a focus on the telecommunications industry, this Article
will call attention to some of the factors that should be considered
by management and its attorneys in planning to do business under
the Agreement. To this end, the Article will review the major pro-
visions of the Agreement"' and its implementing legislation - title
Trade Politics, 36 FORMGN POL'Y 49, 52 (1979); 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 695, 696 (1979).
6 Article XXV of the General Agreement provides the basis for the negotiations held
subsequent to the original agreement: "Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet
from time to time for the purpose of giving effect to those provisions of this Agreement
which involve joint action and, generally, with a view to facilitating the operation and fur-
thering the objectives of this Agreement." GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV; see note 5 supra.
7 Nontariff trade barriers encompass a variety of trade distorting devices including:.
subsidies, quotas, border taxes, discriminatory government procurement, custom valuation
procedures, and other means to encourage exports or discourage imports. See S. REP. No.
1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 74, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7224; Katz,
Economics: Major Elements of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 79 DEP'T OF STATE
BULL. 27, 27 (1979).
8 See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, 9 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 153, 156 (1979);
20 HARv. INT'L L.J. 695, 697 (1979). For background in the events and circumstances which
led to the Tokyo Round negotiations, see S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 1-6, re-
printed in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 387-92.
' See notes 22-24 and accompanying text infra.
10 See GATT, supra note 5, art. HI, para. 5.
" GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/211/Rev. 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Agreement on
Government Procurement].
12 Id., art. II.
S Under one projection, approximately $25 billion in foreign government purchases will
be opened to bidding by businesses within the United States. Katz, supra note 7, at 28.
" See notes 27-57 and accompanying text infra.
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MI of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.15 This will be followed by
a brief outline of the telecommunications market and a discussion
of the political and economic environment in which it presently
operates.1 Since it is that environment upon which the Agreement
and the Act will impact, the Article will conclude with some pro-
jections of what effects the future environment will have on the
telecommunications industry.
THE AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
Background
The seventh round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations spon-
sored by the parties to GATT opened in 1973 with the "Tokyo
Declaration" 17 wherein nearly one hundred foreign ministers de-
clared their intention to reduce or harmonize nontariff as well as
tariff barriers to international trade.18 Although the Trade Act of
197419 codified the process for the United States' participation in
those negotiations and outlined our negotiation objectives,2 0 that
legislation was silent on barriers to government procurement.2
Discrimination in government procurement was not, however,
a new problem in international trade. In fact, many governments
traditionally had encouraged public spending on domestic rather
than foreign products.2 2 Consequently, article HI of the GATT ex-
empted government purchasing from the prohibitions against dis-
criminatory treatment of foreign goods.2 3 Despite the continuing
19 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, §§ 301-309, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 236-42
(codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2518 (Supp. El 1979)). See notes 58-67 and accompanying
text infra.
1* See notes 68-114 and accompanying text infra.
17 See Tokyo Declaration, supra note 3.
U2 See generally Graham, supra note 8, at 155-59. The ministers expressly affirmed that
the negotiation should aim, inter alia, to "reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures or, where
this is not appropriate, to reduce or eliminate their trade restricting or distorting effects,
and to bring such measures under more effective international discipline." Tokyo Declara-
tion, supra note 3, pars. 3(b).
"I 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976).
2* See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 14-15, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7186, 7196-97.
11 Concern for the problems resulting from discriminatory government procurement
was expressed in the legislative history to the Trade Act. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong.,
2d Seas. 83, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7186, 7233.
" See generally R. BLnwiN, NONrARIFu DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 59-70
(1970).
3GATT, supra note 5, art. III, para. 8(a) (as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part
1980]
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nature of this problem, the elimination of discrimination by gov-
ernments in their nondefense procurements has been the subject of
serious discussions by the United States and other developed
Western countries since the conclusion of the preceding round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.24 With this concern in mind, the
Tokyo Round negotiators were successful in initiating a package of
trade agreements 25 which included the Agreement on Government
Procurement.2"
Scope of the Agreement
The purpose of the Agreement on Government Procurement is
straightforward. Each signatory party must accord the products
and suppliers of each other party "treatment no less favorable"
than that accorded to its own or any other party's products and
suppliers.27 The Agreement applies to purchases by all government
entities and agencies under the direct or substantial control of a
signatory party, but its coverage is limited, for a three year trial
period, to those entities which have been volunteered by the par-
ties.2 8 Moreover, the Agreement applies only to procurement con-
II and Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14, 1948, 62
Stat. 3679, T.I.A.S. No. 1890, 62 U.N.T.S. 80). Although article III specifically requires a
signatory party to accord imported products "treatment no less favorable" than that ac-
corded domestic products, GATT, supra note 5, art. III, para. 4, an exception to this "na-
tional treatment" requirement provides:
The provisions of this article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to
use in the production of goods for commercial sale.
Id., art. III, para. 8(a).
24 See generally Pomeranz, Toward a New International Order in Government Pro-
curement, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1263, 1270-79 (1979). See also Gantt & Speck, Domes-
tic v. Foreign Trade Problems in Federal Government Contracting: Buy American Act and
Executive Order, 7 J. PuB. L. 378 (1958).
25 The "package" of agreements included one tariff and eleven nontariff agreements.
Graham, supra note 8, at 159. In addition to covering discriminatory procurement, the
nontariff agreements covered, inter alia, import licensing procedures, subsidies and con-
tervailing duties, technical barriers to trade, and customs valuations practices. See State-
ment by GATT Director-General Oliver Long, GATT Press Rel. No. 1234 (April 12, 1979),
reprinted in Ir'L LEGAL MATERiALS 553, 554 (1979). See generally Graham, supra note 8.
'0 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11.
27 Id., art. II.
" Id., arts. I, para. 1 & III, paras. 5, 13. Those activities volunteered for coverage by the
signatory countries are listed in annex I to the Agreement. Although the term "entity" is not
defined, the Agreement notes that it is understood to include agencies. Id., art. I para. 1(a)
n.1. Thus, the term encompasses government subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities
substantially controlled by the government. Anthony & Hagerty, Cautious Optimism as a
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tracts having a minimum value of 150,000 special drawing rights,29
or approximately $190,000. While it covers products and services
incident to the supply of products, it does not cover service con-
tracts per se.5 0
The Agreement's scope is further limited by provisions that
exempt certain purchases of a covered entity.3 1 For example, a
party may take any action to procure war material, or other indis-
pensable material for national security or defense. Similarly, noth-
ing in the Agreement prevents any party from imposing measures
necessary to protect life, health, or intellectual property.3 2 Finally,
purchases by regional and local governments are not covered by
the Agreement, although the parties have agreed to inform their
local governments about the benefits of liberalization of govern-
ment procurement.3 3
Guide to Foreign Government Procurement, 11 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1301, 1302 n.10
(1979). The United States originally wished to have the agreement apply to "all entities
under the direct or substantial control of governments," id. at 1311 n.52, but settled for
entity-by-entity negotiations directed toward balancing the "relative value of export oppor-
tunities," id. at 1310-11. See also S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 129, reprinted in
[1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381, 515. For example, the European Economic Com-
munity refused to include as covered entities those governmental agencies which purchase
heavy electrical and transportation equipment. Anthony & Hagerty, supra, at 1311. In fact,
the European Economic Community continues to have trouble opening up these markets
even as to its own members. Id. To balance these exclusions, the United States has withheld
coverage of the following entities: the Department of Transportation; the Department of
Energy; the Bureau of Reclamation; the Army Corps of Engineers; the Tennessee Valley
Authority;, the Postal Service; COMSAT; and CONRAIL. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st
Seas. 129-30, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 381, 515-16. While Canada
similarly excluded such entities as its Department of Communications, Department of
Transportation, and Fisheries and Marine Service, new opportunities were opened to busi-
nesses within the United States when Canada volunteered for exclusion its Department of
Energy, Mines and Natural Resources, and its Department of Industry, Trade and Com-
merce. See id. at 145, reprinted in, [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 531.
29 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. I, para. 1(b). Special
Drawing Rights, or "SDR's" are the reserve unit of account for the International Monetary
Fund. A minimum value-threshold for coverage apparently was set to avoid inconveniences
to governmental agencies in applying the Agreement's provisions to small contracts. See
Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 28 at 1321. The Agreement does encourage the parties,
however, to conduct their purchasing on small contracts as if the Agreement were applica-
ble. Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. I, para. 1(b) n.2.
SO Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. I, para. 1(a). The Agree-
ment does provide for renewed negotiations within three years of its implementation at
which time the possibilities of including service contracts within the Agreement's coverage
may be explored. Id., art. IX, pare. 6(b). See Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 28, at 1319-21;
Pomeranz, supra note 24, at 1288-89.
3' Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. VIII.
: Id; see Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 28, at 1322-23.
3 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. I, para. 2.
19801
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Obligations Under The Agreement
1. Technical Specifications
In general, the Agreement places two categories of obligations
on parties with respect to their procurement process. The first of
these requires that technical specifications shall not be prescribed
or applied to create obstacles to international trade.3 4 Specifically,
technical specifications must "be in terms of performance rather
than design" and must "be based on international standards, na-
tional technical regulations" or, where appropriate, recognizable
national standards.3 5 In addition, a product must not be described
by a particular trade name or producer unless there is no other
intelligible way of describing its requirements and unless words
such as "or equivalent" are included in the description."
2. Tendering Procedures
The second, more encompassing set of obligations relates to
bidding, or tendering procedures.3 7 Perhaps the most progressive
Id., art. IV, para. 1. Proper government procurement contract bidding commences
with a well-formulated description of the work to be performed. 1 R. NASH & J. CIBIC,
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW 224 (3d ed. 1977). The description, spelling out the obligations
of the contractor, is usually set forth in drawings, technical documents, and product descrip-
tions; it is commonly known as the specifications. Id. Since the formal advertising and
bidding process provides little opportunity for clarification, specifications must be drafted
with accuracy, precision, and clarity. Id. See generally National Presto Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
In the United States, if specifications are so restrictive as to preclude open competition,
the Comptroller General may require cancellation of the contract. See Comp. Gen. Dec. No.
B-162059, 12 Gov'T CoNT. REP. (CCH) 1 81,315 (1967). Cf. 48 Comp. Gen. 345, 349 (1968)
(performance of contract permitted despite restrictive specifications). Specifications are
overly restrictive if they exceed the minimum needs of the procuring entity. See Comp. Gen.
Dec. No. B-178603, 19 GOV'T CoNT. REP. (CCH) 82,597 (1973).
Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. IV, para. 2.
31 Id., art. IV para. 3. Prior to the agreement and its prohibition on the use of trade
names, it had been observed that those who purchased equipment tended to favor "one
make or model over another." 1B J. McBRmE & I. WACHTEL, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTs §
10,180 at 10-517 (1980); R. NASH & J. CmiNmc, supra note 34, at 237 n.2. Under current
United States procurement practices, advertisement on a "brand name or equal basis" is
proper when insufficient data is available to formulate a description. Comp. Gen. Dec. No.
B-161786, 12 GOV'T CONT. REP. (CCH) 1 81,314 (1967). If reference to a trade name is neces-
sary, it is to be construed as establishing a standard of quality, rather than limiting compe-
tition. See Sherwin v. United States, 436 F.2d 992, 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Specifications which
do not designate a product by its brand name, but which describe the product of a particu-
lar manufacturer in detail, should include the "or equal" phrase. 39 Comp. Gen. 101, 108
(1959).
37 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. V. A typical component
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measures in the Agreement, the tendering procedures require pub-
lic visibility throughout the procurement process. These trans-
parency provisions are intended to promote the purposes of the
Agreement by insuring the application of fair and nondiscrimina-
tory treatment in purchasing. For example, each party must not
only publish any law, regulation, judicial decision, or administra-
tive ruling of general application regarding government procure-
ment, 8 but also must be able to explain its procurement practices
and procedures to any inquiring party.39
of the preferred treatment received by domestic suppliers is the absence of a requirement
that bid invitations be extended to foreign firms. J. EvANs, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERI-
CAN TRADE POLICY 105 (1971). It has been noted that although the Buy-American Act, 41
U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (1976), requires such preferences, other countries which in fact follow
similar procurement practices do so without publishing explicit standards. J. EVANS, supra,
at 105-06.
Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. VI, para. 1. While dis-
crimination in government procurement has been overt in the United States, see note 37,
supra, "discriminatory measures are tacit in other countries, but they are often present in
the form of administrative practices." W. CLINE, N. KAWANABE, T. KRONSJO & T. WILLIAMS,
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE TOKYO RouND 190 (1978).
39 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. VI, para. 1. Prior to the
Agreement, various United States entities encountered difficulties obtaining information
necessary for them to compete in the foreign market. Anthony & Hagarty, supra note 28, at
1323. Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, for example, openly advertised only a
minimal number of their contracts. Id. Article VI additionally stipulates that any entity so
requested must provide suppliers with information as to why it is not qualified to be in-
cluded on a supplier's list, or was not invited to submit a bid on a particular contract.
Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. VI, para. 2. Throughout the
negotiations, the United States sought a guarantee that the name of the winning bidder, as
well as the amount of the award, would be published after issuance of the procurement
contract. Pomeranz, supra note 24, at 1285. A compromise was reached whereby unsuccess-
ful tenderers are to be notified either in writing or by publication within seven working days
after the award. Upon request bidders will be informed why their tenders were not selected,
given information about the winning bid and the name of the winning bidder. Id.
Solicitation in the United States is implemented through an Invitation For Bids (IFB).
1 R. NASH & J. CmINic, supra note 34, at 244. Armed Services and Federal Procurement
Regulations require that bids be solicited from all qualified supply sources. 32 C.F.R. § 2-
102.1(a) (1979); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.102(a) (1979). Therefore, the IFB must be mailed to a num-
ber of prospective bidders sufficient to insure adequate competition. 32 C.F.R. § 2-203.1
(1979); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.203-1 (1979). A procuring agency obtains names through a special
search for a specific procurement or through an appropriate Bidders Mailing List which it
maintains. See 32 C.F.R. § 2-205 (1979); 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.205 (1979). See also R. NASH & J.
CMINIC, supra note 34, at 245. The IFB is required to be displayed at the place of con-
tracting, 32 C.F.R. § 1-1002-2 (1979), and the procuring agency must publish a summary of
its needs in the Commerce Business Daily, issued by the Department of Commerce. 32
C.F.R. § 1-1003.1 (1979); 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.1003-1 (1979). The agency is further required to
retain a reasonable number of copies of the IFB in the contracting office and provide them
to others having a legitimate interest in the procurement. 32 C.F.R. § 2-203.1 (1979); 41
C.F.R. § 1-2.203-1 (1979). The IFB spells out the "ground rules of the competition," includ-
1980]
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Restrictions also have been placed on the permissibility of the
various methods of tendering and, therefore, should guarantee
greater visibility and fairness. Specifically, the Agreement provides
for three distinct types of tendering-open, selective, and single
tendering.4° Since the procuring entity contacts suppliers individu-
ally under single tendering, this tendering procedure is permissible
only in limited instances.41 Under open tendering procedures, how-
ever, all interested suppliers are allowed to submit a tender.42 Sim-
ilarly, under selective tendering procedures, all suppliers invited to
submit bids may do so.4 . Consequently, open and selective tender-
ing may be used interchangeably provided notice of each proposed
offering is published, and sufficient tenders are invited to insure
ing the "bid opening time" and place and whatever information bidders have to supply. 1 R.
NASH & J. CmINIC, supra note 34, at 245. It further contains the specifications to be used or
incorporates them by reference, and includes "the terms and conditions of the proposed
contract." Id. These procedures encourage a maximum of potential bidders and an increase
in competition. Id. at 245-46.
"0 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. V, para. 1; see Note,
Technical Analysis of the Government Procurement Agreement, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1345, 1350-53 (1979); Note, Eliminating Nontariff Barriers to International Trade: The
MTN Agreement on Government Procurement, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L LAW & POL. 315, 335-37
(1979). The effectiveness of these tendering procedures has been questioned, since signatory
countries need only demonstrate a good faith effort to comply. See Anthony & Hagerty,
supra note 28 at 1328. For a brief overview of tender methods used in the United States, see
1 R. NASH & J. CmEimc, supra note 34, at 245.
4 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. V, para. 15. Instances
where single tendering is appropriate include unsatisfactory responses to open or selective
tenders, limited availability of a product due to its unique nature, urgency, and the need to
replace parts from a particular supplier. Id. See generally IV W. SURREY & D. WALLACE,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § IV-1.4(a) (1980). In the United States, for exam-
ple, statutory authority permits contracting without advertising in limited instances - such
as where the consideration does not exceed $10,000 - when public exigency is present, or if
there is a single supply source. 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1976). A public exigency is "a sudden and
unexpected happening, an unforeseen occurrence or condition, a perplexing contingency or
complication of circumstances, or a sudden or unexpected occasion for action." 38 Comp.
Gen. 171, 173 (1958).
42 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. V, para. 1. Since an
invitation to the "general public" is inherent in an open tender, it is the least restrictive
method of government procurement. "Unfortunately for world trade, the selective and sin-
gle tender systems are more prevalently used for government procurements." Allison, The
Nontarifi Trade Barrier Challenge: Development and Distortion in the Age of Indepen-
dence, 12 TULSA L.J. 1, 13-14 (1976).
"' Entities which employ selective tendering may maintain permanent lists of qualified
suppliers. Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. V, para. 6. The
Agreement prescribes safeguards, such as the publication of conditions for inscription on a
list, to insure that this method is not used to preclude competition. Id. Tenders must be
invited "from the maximum number of domestic and foreign suppliers, consistent with effi-
cient operation of the procurement system." Id., para. 5.
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
maximum international competition.44
Regardless of the tendering procedure employed, the procure-
ment entity may not discriminate against or among foreign suppli-
ers in the process of qualifying them to participate in the tendering
process.45 More particularly, any condition for establishing the
financial or technical capability of a supplier must be nondiscrimi-
natory.4 6 Finally, all interested suppliers must be given whatever
information is necessary to permit them to submit responsive and
timely tenders.
Additional transparency requirements built into the Agree-
ment assure the regularity of tender openings and awards. For ex-
ample, bid openings must be in the presence of tenderers, their
representatives, or impartial witnesses. 8 Moreover, the procuring
entity must award the contract to the tenderer submitting the low-
est bid or the bid determined under prior published criteria to be
the most advantageous, provided of course, that such party is fully
capable of performance. 4 An unsuccessful tenderer must be in-
formed that a contract has been awarded, and upon request, the
procurement entity must provide him with the reasons why it was
not selected, including information on the characteristics and rela-
tive advantages of the tender selected,5 and the name of the win-
44 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. V, para. 2.
45 Discriminatory tendering practices assume a variety of forms. Purchases may be
made from foreign firms, for example, only if products are unavailable from domestic pro-
ducers. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENTAL BuY-NATONAL PRACTICES OF THE
UNrrED STATES AND OTHER CouNTRiEs - AN ASSESSMENT 41-42 (1976). Another method is
the imposition of artificial product standards. Id. at 44-45. See generally Note, Eliminating
Nontariff Barriers to International Trade: The MTN Agreement on Governmental Pro-
curement, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L LAW & POL. 315, 325-33 (1979).
4' Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. V, para. 2(b).
47 Id., para. 2(a).
48 Id., para. 14(d). This section seeks to implement a consistent procedure to be fol-
lowed at bid openings. See Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 28, at 1326-27.
4' Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. V, para. 14(f). By stat-
ute, in the United States, an "[a]ward shall be made... to that responsible bidder whose
bid conforming to the invitation for bids, will be considered most advantageous to the gov-
ernment, price and other factors considered. . . ." 41 U.S.C. § 253(b) (1976). Factors to be
evaluated other than price include foreseeable costs and delays, changes requested by the
bidder, and the feasibility of making more than one award. 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.407-5 (1979). It
appears settled, however, that the principle factor is price. See 37 Comp. Gen. 51 (1957).
50 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. VI, para. 4. Information
as to why a particular tender was selected may be useful to an unsuccessful bidder. It is
suggested, however, that some degree of discrimination in the procurement process is
inevitable.
1980]
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ning tenderer.51 Finally, procedures must be established to hear
and review complaints arising out of any phase of the procurement
process.52
Enforcement of Provisions
A self-policing mechanism is provided to enforce the Agree-
ment's provisions.5 s Thus, if a signatory party believes that an ob-
jective of the Agreement is impaired by another party, and its
grievance cannot be resolved upon consultation with that party,5
then the standing Committee on Government Procurement, estab-
lished under article VII of the Agreement, will meet to investigate
the grievance and try to resolve the problem.5 5 If unsuccessful, ei-
ther party may request the Committee to form a panel to investi-
gate the issues further, and attempt to reconcile the dispute. 6 If
the panel is likewise unsuccessful, the Committee will make final
recommendations to the parties. If those recommendations are not
accepted, the Committee may authorize a party to suspend, in
whole or in part, the application of the Agreement to any other
party for an appropriate time.57
51 Id.
52 Id., para. 5. It has been observed that the "first stage in any dispute resolution under
the Code is consultation." Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 28, at 1329.
'3 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. VII. Recently, GATT
provisions for the settlement of disputes have become increasingly ineffective. Graham, Re-
sults of the Tokyo Round, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 171 (1979). See generally I W.
SURREY & D. WALLACE, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § I-
2.3(b) (2d ed. 1980).
Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. VII, para. 4.
15 The Agreement provides for the establishment of a Committee on Government Pro-
curement, composed of respresentatives of the Parties to the to the Agreement, id., pare. 1,
which is to monitor transactions pursuant to the Agreement. See Note, Technical Analysis
of the Government Procurement, 11 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L BUs. 1345, 1355 (1979).
Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. VII, para. 9. Each panel
may operate in any manner it deems appropriate. Id.
17 Id., para. 14. The enforcement mechanism must deal with two distinct situations: a
good faith disagreement concerning a party's obligations, and a purposeful disregard of the
agreement. Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 28, at 1328. While self-policing provisions may
adequately settle disputes in the first instance, they will be clearly insufficient in the latter.
It has been observed that "compliance with the Code is always purely voluntary, notwith-
standing a signatory's agreement to comply." Id. Suspension of the Agreement to a party
should only be authorized by the Committee if "circumstances are serious enough to justify
such action." Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. VII, para. 14.
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TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979
The Agreement on Government Procurement, as well as the
other agreements reached by the representatives to the Tokyo
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, could not have become
enforceable with respect to the United States without congres-
sional approval.51 Such approval came with the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, which authorized the President to accept for the
United States the final texts of the Tokyo Round agreements initi-
ated by the negotiators in Geneva on April 12, 1979.51
Although the Trade Agreements Act implements in excess of a
dozen trade agreements, the implementation of the Agreement on
Government Procurement is contained exclusively within title III
of the Trade Agreements Act.60 The major thrust of title In is that
it allows the President to waive any law, regulation, or procedure
which, if applied to products or suppliers covered by the Agree-
ment, would result in discriminatory government procurement.61
The President's waiver authority, however, is not unlimited. Such
waiver may be made only with respect to the eligible products or
suppliers of those foreign countries or instrumentalities which the
President has determined fall within one of the following four cate-
gories: The country is a party to the Agreement and provides "ap-
propriate reciprocal competitive government procurement opportu-
k The Constitution expressly grants the power "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign
nations" to Congress. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress may, however, delegate a sub-
stantial portion of this authority to the President. California Bankers Ass'n. v. Schultz, 416
U.S. 21, 59 (1974). The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1976), granted the President
the authority over a 5-year period to enter into trade agreements, but provided that Con-
gressional approval was necessary before such agreements would be given effect. Id. at §
2112; see S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 21-22, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Naws 7186, 7201.
1' S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG.-&
AD. NEws 381, 417-18; see Act of July 26, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 2, 93 Stat. 144 (1979)
(to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2503).
10 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2518 (Supp. III 1979); S. REP.
No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 128, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 381,
514.
" Elimination of discriminatory government procurement procedures was a principle
objective of the United States during the Tokyo Round. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 128, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 318, 514. The Buy-American
Act is an example of such discrimination. See 41 U.S.C. § 10a-10d (1976). S. REP. No. 249,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 381, 408. The
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 allows the President to waive Buy-American Act restrictions
and other obstacles which discriminate against designated foreign suppliers. See 20 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 687, 691 (1979).
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nities to United States products and suppliers;" the country is not
a major industrial country and, although not a party to the Agree-
ment, will abide by the provisions of the Agreement with respect to
the United States and grant such reciprocal opportunities to
United States products; the country is not a major industrial coun-
try, is not a party to the Agreement, and does not have the ability
to comply with the procedural obligations of the Agreement relat-
ing to the procurement process, but will grant reciprocal opportu-
nities to United States products and suppliers on a bilateral basis;
or the country is a least developed country. 2
The benefits which should accrue from nondiscriminatory gov-
ernment purchasing cannot be realized, however, unless several na-
tions agree to abide by the provisions of the Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement. In recognition of this fact, Congress has
incorporated within the Trade Agreements Act two mechanisms
which insure not only compliance with the Agreement by signatory
nations, but also act to encourage nonsignatories to become parties
to the Agreement. The first of these operates by authorizing the
President to modify or withdraw a waiver or designation of eligibil-
ity previously granted by him.63 The second and more effective
lever designed to assure reciprocity in government procurement re-
quires the President to prohibit purchases by government entities
of products of a foreign country which have not been designated as
eligible for a waiver by the time the first waiver is granted under
the Act. 4 The impact of this provision is somewhat lessened, how-
ever, since the President may delay a prohibition for up to two
62 19 U.S.C. § 2511 (Supp. III 1979). The act defines a "least developed country" as a
country so designated by the United Nations General Assembly. See id., § 2518. Major in-
dustrial countries include "Canada, the European Economic Community, the individual
member countries of such Community, Japan, and any other foreign country designated by
the President." 19 U.S.C. § 2136(d) (1976). This definition is derived from a subsection of
the Trade Act of 1974 and is incorporated by reference in the Trade Agreements Act of
1979. See 19 U.S.C. § 2518 (Supp. 1I 1979).
63 19 U.S.C. § 2511 (Supp. 1I 1979). This provision was designed to enable the Presi-
dent to accommodate necessary changes as a result of dispute settlements or expansion of
the scope of the Agreement. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 133, reprinted in [1979]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 519. The President's authority to modify waivers and
delegations is limited, and, in some instances, consultation with Congress is necessary. See
19 U.S.C. § 2514 (Supp. III 1979).
4 See 19 U.S.C. § 2512 (Supp. 1I 1979). For the first 3 years of the Agreement, parties
to the agreement may exclude any agencies from coverage. See 20 HARv. INT'L L.J. 695, 699
(1979). Such exclusions may have the effect of banning United States suppliers from certain
bids, while foreign suppliers may still bid for domestic procurements. S. REP. No. 249, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 135, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 381, 521.
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years in the case of all but major industrial countries.65 The Presi-
dent may also authorize agency heads, in general, and the Secre-
tary of Defense, in particular, to waive a prohibition on a case-by-
case basis when it is in the national interest, or when a country
enters into a reciprocal procurement agreement with the Depart-
ment of Defense.66 The Act does, however, authorize the President
to do what he deems necessary to induce others to become parties
to the Agreement or to give appropriate reciprocity to the United
States.6
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS BusiNrss
While the objectives of the Agreement on Government Pro-
curement are obviously desirable, it may have deleterious effects
on the telecommunications industry within the United States. To
understand the problems which may arise requires an overview of
the telecommunications market as it presently operates. Basically,
that market can be divided into two major segments. The first is
comprised of sales to commercial or nondefense customers includ-
ing governments and private parties.6 ' The second is comprised of
sales to governmental customers who purchase for national defense
purposes.
The Nondefense Market
The global telecommunications market consists of products
used for transmitting, switching, and receiving voice and data com-
munications for commercial and consumer purposes.6 ' Worldwide,
65 19 U.S.C. § 2512 (Supp. M 1979). Section 2512 addresses an outright prohibition
against the procurement of products from nondesignated countries, while section 2511 deals
with waiving restrictions for designated countries. Compare id. § 2511 with id. § 2512.
Id. § 2512.
67 Id. § 2511(a)(2). See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 134, reprinted in [1979]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 520.
"The segment of the industry whose sales are to commercial and nondefense custom-
ers will be referred to as the "nondefense market."
61 Transmission products include microwave, radio, cable, and multiplex equipment.
See Millar, Data-Transmission Equipment, in COMMUNICATION SYSTEM ENGINEERING HAND-
BOOK ch. 12 (D. Hamsher ed. 1967). Switching products encompass the large electromechani-
cal, electronic, or digital switchboards used in telephone company central offices, the smaller
private automatic branch exchanges (PABX's), as well as desk-top apparatus. See Schnei-
der, Switching Engineering of Switched Systems, in COMMUNICATION SYSTEM ENGINEERING
HANDBOOK ch. 7 (D. Hamsher ed. 1967). Receiving, or subscriber, products include both the
telephone instrument itself and ancillary equipment used in the home and office. Burkhard
& Clare, User Equipment and Services, in COMMUNICATION SYSTEM ENGINEERING HANDBOOK,
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the industry has annual sales of approximately $40 billion,70 with a
little less than one-half of the purchases occurring in the United
States and the remainder divided approximately equally between
Europe and the rest of the world. 1
In the United States, the major customers for telecommunica-
tions products are the privately owned telephone operating compa-
nies, such as those in the Bell and General Telephone systems.7 2 A
2-53 to 2-66 (D. Hamsher ed. 1967).
70 I ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., WORLD TELECOMMUNICATIONS, OVERVIEW AND TECHNOLOGIo
CAL TRENDS 49 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ADL]. Estimates of industry sales range up to
$60 billion. E.g., ARNOLD BERNHARD & Co., THE VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY 749 (5th
ed. 1980). Revenue is generated from two types of sources. Data communication networks
comprise approximately $5 billion of total sales, but telephone use represents the principal
revenue source. STANDARD & POOR'S -TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY SURVEY T9 (Jan. 17,
1980). See generally U.S. Dar'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK ch. 34 (1978).
7' The United States is expected to retain its position as the "largest market in the
world" for the purchase of telecommunications equipment during the next decade. 1 ADL,
supra note 70, at 49. In 1980, the United States will sell a total of $16.9 billion worth of
telecommunications equipment. Id. In 1985, the annual sales total is expected to be in the
area of $24.8 billion. Id. By 1990, the projected sales of United States telecommunications
equipment are expected to reach $35.5 billion annually. Id. Despite the increase in sales that
is expected for the United States telecommunications industry over the next ten years, its
share of the total telecommunications market worldwide is expected to drop from its current
42.3% to 40.6% by 1990. Id. By contrast, the Asian telecommunications market is the most
rapidly growing market in the world today and, consequently, is expected to replace Europe
as the "second largest regional market" during the 1980's. Id. Presently, Western European
countries account for the largest "aggregate share" of the region's market with total sales
expected to reach $16.3 billion by 1990. Id. The remaining regions in the world market,
Latin America, Oceania, and Africa, aggregately represent 5% to 6% of the world market.
Id. at 49. These smaller regional markets are attractive to the rest of the world, despite their
size, because they have remained uncommitted to one particular source for their supply of
telecommunications equipment. Id. at 49-50.
11 The largest domestic telecommunications company in the United States is American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T). Its subsidiaries include Western Electric Co., Inc.
(Western Electric) and Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. (Bell Labs), as well as over twenty
local telephone companies. Western Electric manufactures and services equipment for the
Bell System, accounting for approximately 80% of United States equipment purchases in
1980. Bell Labs, responsible for research and development in the Bell System, is owned by
AT&T and Western Electric. MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITY
MANUAL 108-09 (1979); 2 ADL, supra note 70, at 97. General Telephone & Electronics Corp.
(GTE), the principal competitor of AT&T, is a holding company which controls telephone
and manufacturing enterprises. MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., supra, at 806.
Domestic competition, fostered by judicial and administrative action, see, e.g., Hush-A-
Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In re Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d
420, 13 Red. Reg. (P-H) 2d 597, aff'd mem., 14 F.C.C.2d 571, 14 Rad. Reg. (P-H) 2d 185
(1968), is expected to continue to dilute the market dominance thus far enjoyed by AT&T
in the telecommunications equipment market. ARNOLD BERNHARD & CO., THE VALUE LIN
INVESTMENT SURVEY 749 (5th ed. 1980). See generally STANDARD & POOR'S TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS INDUSTRY SURVEY T3-T21 (1980).
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relatively new source of activity, however, has come from the Inter-
connect companies. These companies provide private telephone
equipment and service in competition with the telephone compa-
nies, usually in commercial settings, and are becoming increasingly
large suppliers."3 In Europe, Latin America, the Mid-East, the Far-
East, and Africa, transmission, switching, and subscriber equip-
ment is purchased principally by the postal, telegraph, and tele-
phone administrations or corporations (PTT's).74 The PTT's are
either owned or substantially controlled by government entities
and their primary function is to maintain and operate the tele-
phone systems.7 5
The Defense Market
The United States defense telecommunications business com-
prises only a small part of the multi-billion dollar defense electron-
ics industry.7 6 Driven by high technology and backed by large ex-
penditures in research and development, the equipment used in
defense telecommunications is generally the same type as that
found in the nondefense sector.7 7 Since its use, however, is prima-
rily for command, control, and communications for national de-
fense, it has historically been of greater reliability than equipment
utilized for nondefense purposes. Recently, however, the accept-
able level of technology in the defense business has become more
73 Equipment which can be connected into AT&T's central switching apparatus is now
provided by private firms to end-users. GENmERL AccouNTING OFFICE, UNITED STATES-JAPAN
TRADE: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 61 (1979) (Report of the Comptroller General to the Joint
Economic Committee) [hereinafter cited as Comptroller General Report]. The genesis of
this activity was the 1968 FCC decision, In re Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 13 Rad. Reg. (P-
H) 2d 597, affd mem., 14 F.C.C.2d 571, 14 Rad. Reg. (P-H) 2d 185 (1968), which legalized
interconnection. A registration program adopted by the FCC in 1975 permits terminal
equipment to be interconnected with the Bell System without negotiation between the com-
peting supplier and AT&T. MOODY'S INvSTORS SERviCE, INC., MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITY
MANUAL 110 (1979). Private buyers who acquire equipment through interconnect companies
will represent approximately 21% of the telephone equipment purchasers in 1980. 2 ADL,
supra note 70, at 97.
74 See generally UNIED NATIoNs STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 627-30 (1978).
75 See Comptroller General Report, supra note 73, at 63. National PTT's in Europe
also have varying standardized designs for telephone systems in different countries. Id. A
natural result of the varying designs of European telephone systems is that "regulations on
technology, design and size for other types of telephone equipment vary from country to
country." Id.
76 See STANDARD & PooR's ELECTRONICS-ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY SURVEY E31 (1979).
7 See 1981 Department of Defense Appropriations Hearings, Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., part 7 at 395 (1980).
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common in the commercial business. The convergence of these
technologies has resulted in the increasing adaptation of standard
commercial equipment to military needs. This pattern appears to
be similar to that experienced in the rest of the world.7 8
The Pre-Agreement Sales Environment
1. The Environment in the Nondefense Market
Since 1933, the United States, under the Buy-American Act,7
has with limited exceptions 0 required government agencies to dis-
criminate in their purchase of products for public purposes in
favor of domestic products. This preference generally has included
a six percent price preference for United States products over for-
eign products, and a twelve percent preference if the United States
seller is a small business or labor surplus area concern." Many
states have enacted Buy-American-type preferences as well. Al-
though most foreign countries do not practice discrimination under
an express statute such as the Buy-American Act,8 2 they neverthe-
7'8 See notes 144-49 infra.
7. Ch. 212, tit. III, §§ 1-3, 47 Stat. 1520 (1933) (current version at 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d
(1976)). The Buy-American Act deals with purchases of materials by the federal government
for "public use." 41 U.S.C. § 10a (1976). Severe unemployment during the depression acted
as an impetus for this legislation, which was designed to protect vulnerable domestic indus-
tries from foreign competition. See Note, Eliminating Nontariff Barriers to International
Trade: The MTN Agreement on Government Procurement, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
315, 319-20 (1979). For a discussion of the Buy-American Act's legislative history, see Gantt
& Speck, Domestic v. Foreign Trade Problems in Federal Government Contracting: Buy
American Act and Executive Order, 7 J. PuB. L. 378, 378-82 (1958).
00 The provisions of the Act are inapplicable to articles, materials, or supplies to be
used outside of the United States or if articles, materials, or supplies are not produced "in
sufficient and reasonably available commercial quantities and of a satisfactory quality." 41
U.S.C. § 10a (1976).
0' Exec. Order No. 10,582, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1954-1958 Compilation). Price preferences for
domestic products have continued to be the subject of political controversy. The original
Act of 1933 was the direct result of the massive unemployment gripping the country during
the Great Depression. See Trainor, Buy American Act: Examination, Analysis and Com-
parison, 64 MIL. L. REv. 101 (1974).
82 See GENERAL AcCOUNrIN OFFIcE, GovERNmNrAL Buy NATIONAL PRACTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OTHER CouNTmRis-AN Ass.ssMErr 7-8, 39 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
GAO Report]. Nontariff barriers are often justified by political considerations, such as a
desire to provide jobs for the unemployed, or a desire to protect vulnerable industries from
foreign competition. See Note, Eliminating Nontariff Barriers to International Trade: The
MTN Agreement On Government Procurement, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 315, 324
(1979). Supporters of trade-restrictive policies for national security items argue that in the
event of a crisis, the American national security demands a healthy domestic industry so
that needed products would not have to come from foreign sources. Id. at 325.
[Vol. 55:63
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
less have favored domestic over foreign products through a body of
administrative practices and other nontariff barriers. These more
subtle nontariff barriers include a reluctance by purchasing agents
to involve themselves in the intricacies of foreign sourcing, and pa-
triotic notions that it is best to look solely to domestic sources.88 Of
greater significance to the telecommunications industry is that
most foreign countries have adopted either the international tele-
phone system standard (CCITT)8 or have developed their own
unique standard for telecommunications equipment. In the United
States, however, the substantially different Bell standard is used. 5
An obvious example of procurement discrimination is the Eu-
ropean Economic Community's internal directive that purchases
from outside the European Community (EC) may be made by
members only if the product is not available from other EC mem-
ber states.8 6 Postal, telegraph, and telephone administrations, how-
ever, are excluded from the scope of the internal directive.87
Purchases of telecommunication equipment by the PTT's of the
individual members, however, are governed by their own more re-
strictive procurement requirements.8 Since the EC members have
withheld telecommunication purchases by the PTT's from the cov-
erage of the Agreement on Government Procurement, a substantial
disadvantage to United States exporters of telecommunications
equipment remains unrectified. Moreover, European telephone-op-
erating companies either hold an ownership stake in local suppliers
or maintain well-established relationships with them.8 9 Domestic
procurement policies are not, however, the only barriers which in-
hibit the flow of telecommunications products between the United
See note 82 supra.
The International Telegraph and Telephone Consultive Committee (CCITT) is a ma-
jor consulting department of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), an organi-
zation through which governmental telecommunications administrations may reach agree-
ment on technical standards. 1 ADL, supra note 70, at 35.
"See Comp. Gen. at 63.
See GAO Report, supra note 82, at 40-49.
6" Id.
" Id. In August 1980, the EEC Commission urged the European Council to require that
member state PTT's procure at least 10% of their telecommunications needs from other
member states in order to further the standardization of equipment within Europe and to
facilitate new services. In addition, the Council was urged to require members to open to
other member states all PTT purchases of telephone interconnect equipment, starting in
1981. 26 ELECTRONIC NEWS 1302 (Aug. 18, 1980, at 19, col. 1).
11 1 ADL, supra note 70, at 23.
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States and the EC.9 0 A significant additional obstacle has been the
imposition of technical specifications and maintenance require-
ments which favor local suppliers.91 While all of these barriers
have, to some extent, induced United States firms to open foreign
subsidiaries in European markets, those subsidiaries are frequently
not viewed in the same benign manner as domestic firms.92
Trade patterns similar to those of the United States and Eu-
rope are apparent among other nations. In Mideastern and African
countries which are currently developing telecommunications sys-
tems, for example, industry growth has occurred largely through
public tenders of sizeable contracts to prequalified suppliers.9 3 A
local manufacturing presence is frequently required to become a
prequalified, long-term supplier.9 4 Moreover, to the extent that for-
eign purchasing does exist, it is somewhat restricted by the strong
technical and economic ties between many developing countries
and former colonial powers.9 5 Similarly, telecommunications
purchases in countries of the Far East are usually directly or indi-
rectly controlled by the government.9 Japan, in order to insulate
its home market from competition, has essentially embargoed sales
of major categories of United States telecommunications prod-
ucts.97 Additionally, while Taiwan and Korea use equipment built
to the United States standard, both often require local manufac-
turing investment and national participation in the business.9 8
In the more developed countries of Central and Latin
America, such as Brazil and Mexico, there is a desire and capabil-
ity to control the domestic telecommunications technology. Control
is often accomplished through a requirement of local manufacture
or assembly, and a plan for increasing local material and labor con-
tent. Furthermore, in those countries which are now developing
90 Id. at 28.
91 See generally D. McLAcLIN & D. SwAM, COMPMEITON POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN
CoMMuNmrY 61 (1967).
" Representatives of U.S. foreign subsidiaries have expressed a concern over "a shrink-
ing government market because of the increasing competitiveness of domestic corporations."
See GAO Report, supra note 82, at 39.
13 See 1 ADL, supra note 70, at 20.
See id. at 21.
In the so-called "Francophone countries," for example, substantial reliance placed on
French suppliers is due, in part, to past relationships with France. Id., at 8.
"For a brief description of the "Buy National" policy in Taiwan, see 4 ADL, supra
note 70, at 253.
97 See note 110 infra; GAO Report supra note 82, at 49-52.
98 See 4 ADL, supra note 70, at 202.
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their telecommunications systems, the purchasing decision may be
subject to factors other than supply and demand. A government
controlled PTT may well be motivated by the need to control in-
flation, to support a fledgling industry, to adjust the balance of
payments, or to support local employment.
2. The Sales Environment in the Defense Market
The United States, like most nations, has preferred to satisfy
its defense telecommunications needs from domestic suppliers. For
example, the Department of Defense (DOD), under its program for
Industrial Preparedness Planning, purchases communications
equipment almost exclusively from domestic firms.99 Moreover, the
DOD has given a 50% price preference to domestic products since
1959, thereby adjusting the United States balance of payments.100
Conflicting factors will undoubtedly continue to influence in-
ternational sales of defense telecommunications equipment. North
Atlantic Treaty Organization allies have expressed their need for a
fair share of defense procurement for economic and national secur-
ity reasons, and for increasing their research and development ca-
pability.101 Perhaps there exists a growing feeling in some foreign
quarters that the United States should not be the world's arsenal
and that defense supply responsibilities should be shared among
the countries subject to mutual defense pacts. The DOD, for its
part, is looking with greater frequency to foreign sources for more
advantageous prices. 02 These conflicting concerns increasingly are
being addressed, independent of the Agreement, through memo-
"GAO Report, supra note 82, at 13. See Note, Eliminating Nontariff Barriers to In-
ternational Trade - The MTN Agreement on Government Procurement, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L
L. & POL. 315, 325 (1979).
100 32 C.F.R. § 6-104.4(b) (1979). The fifty percent price preference, also known as the
"fifty percent test," Watkins, Effects of the Buy American Act on Federal Procurement, 31
FED. BAl J. 191, 198 (1972) is straightforward. For purposes of the Buy-American Act, a
product is considered foreign if "the foreign components" of the good or product "aggregate
fifty percent or more of the total component cost of that material." Id. This requirement has
been strictly applied. Id.
101 GAO Report, supra note 82, at 13. For an insight into the views of several allies on
the matter of defense cooperation in NATO, see "Proceedings of the Seminar on U.S. De-
fense Cooperation with Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal," Washing-
ton, D.C., January, 1980.
10 In Watkins-Johnson Company, No. B-195805, 29 BCA 1 85,633 (1980) the Comp-
troller General recently upheld an Air Force award to a British firm, stating- "We do not
find an intent to maintain current domestic sources of supply, but rather an intent to in-
crease the amount of defense equipment furnished by non-domestic sources." Id.
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randa of understanding0 " between the Department of Defense and
its foreign government counterparts. There are three types of pro-
curement-oriented memoranda presently in effect: (1) restricted
purchase offset arrangements; (2) unrestricted purchase offset ar-
rangements; and (3) reciprocal procurement arrangements. Each
anticipates the waiver of Buy-American and balance of payment
price equalization requirements for some amount of United States
purchases of foreign products. Under both types of offset memo-
randa, a foreign country agrees to purchase a particular defense
product. The United States, in turn, commits the domestic indus-
try primarily benefiting from the foreign purchase, to provide off-
set sale opportunities to the foreign country's industry.104 The
amount of the offset commitment is based upon a fixed percentage
of the purchase by the foreign country. 05 The distinction between
restricted and unrestricted offset arrangements lies in the availa-
bility of the exemption from the Buy-American Act, balance of
payments price differential requirements, and import duties on the
offset purchases. In the case of unrestricted offsets, all offset
purchases made to fill the requirements of American defense agen-
cies may be exempted, while for restricted offsets to be eligible for
an exemption, the offset purchase must be in support of the de-
fense product purchased by the foreign country. 06 Under both
types of offset arrangements, however, waivers are made on a case-
by-case basis. Reciprocal procurement agreements are intended to
remove barriers - such as customs duties and buy-national re-
103 The United States is party to reciprocal procurement agreements with France, May
22, 1978, U.S. DEmARTm~r OF STATE, TRFATws m FORCE 78 (1980), Italy, September 11,
1978, id. at 108, the Netherlands, August 24, 1978, id. at 148, Norway, May 19, 1979, id. at
157, West Germany, October 17, 1978, id. at 72, Portugal, May 28, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 9433,
the United Kingdom, September 24, 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 9033.
104 If the industry fails to honor the reciprocal commitments of a memorandum, the
DOD may -itself fulfill the obligation. Hearings on H.R. 11607 Before the Committee on
Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability, and
Readiness, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 981-98 (1978) (statement of Walter R. Edgington). See id.
at 643-47 (statement of Richard C. Bowman).
!05 Under the United States-Australia offset, for example, the United States has com-
mitted itself to a combined United States industry and Department of Defense offset acqui-
sition objective of 25% of the value of major (over $500,000) Australian foreign military
sales purchases from the United States. Under the United States-Switzerland offset ar-
rangement, the acquisition objective is at least 30% of the value of Swiss orders for United
States F-5E and F-5F aircraft.
106 For example, under the offset arrangement between the United States and the par-
ticipating European governments (Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway), the
item procured must be in support of the F-16 aircraft program to be eligible for a waiver.
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quirements-to DOD procurement of defense equipment items."'
These agreements are significantly broader than offset arrange-
ments, since there is no fixed qualitative or quantitative objective
which the foreign purchase must meet. A typical implementation
of these agreements includes an issuance by the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense of a blanket waiver of Buy-American Act restric-
tions, balance of payment bid evaluation differentials, and import
duties on all foreign produced items0 8 procured by DOD agen-
cies.109 In essence, each party promises unrestricted access to the
other's defense procurement market.
THE IMPACT OF THE PRE-AGREEMENT SALES ENVIRONMENT ON
GOVERNMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROCUREMENT
The Impact on Nondefense Procurement
Foreign nontariff barriers have effectively deterred export
sales by United States suppliers. Indeed, the Japanese and Euro-
pean markets are virtually closed to United States telecommunica-
tions products.110 In developing markets, the requirement of local
investment and the use of increasing amounts of local material and
labor create an additional chilling effect on United States export
sales.
The closure of a substantial portion of government-controlled
foreign PTT markets to United States exports, coupled with the
structure of the United States telecommunications equipment
market-comprised mainly of nongovernment customers-has
had a serious adverse impact on United States suppliers. The pri-
mary consequence is a direct barrier to foreign source income. The
1'7 The impetus for the reciprocal procurement agreement is a desire to facilitate non-
nuclear combat effectiveness of the military forces of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
members by standardizing weapon systems, ammunition, fuel, and other military imple-
ments for land, air, and naval forces. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-365, 88 Stat. 399.
208 For example, surgeons' blades purchased by the Defense Personnel Supply Center
would be eligible for the exemptions if the blades were made in a country with which the
United States has such a reciprocal procurement agreement.
"' See 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (1976); GAO Report, supra note 82, at 13.
110 It has been estimated that the Japanese telecommunications industry could open an
additional $3.3 billion to export competition. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 1, 145,
reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 381, 531. See generally CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, BACKGROUND PAPER: TH EFFECTS oF THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE U.S. EcONOMY: AN UPDATED Vmw 25 (1979); Are "They" in
Trouble? (Japanese Telecommunications), Electronic News, Mar. 15, 1979, at 24, col. 1.
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second, more subtle effect is the injury resulting from the inability
of United States firms to reach or maintain economies of scale or
to recoup the large research and development investments neces-
sary to retain a competitive position in their own market. This ad-
ditional impediment is largely due to the ability of foreign export-
ers to compete successfully in the large United States
nongovernment market, while reaping high profit sales from a
home market protected from price or import competition.111 With
respect to nondefense telecommunications purchases by the
United States Government, however, the 6% Buy-American price
preference has provided a meaningful edge over foreign competi-
tors. This factor has been especially critical in preserving for
American suppliers sales of central office and other switching
equipment.
The Impact on Defense Procurement
Domestic sales of communications equipment to the United
States Government for defense purposes are generally protected
from foreign .competition by the Buy-American Act and Depart-
ment of Defense price preferences. 112 Likewise, foreign government
preferences for their own defense communications equipment,
when domestically available, are a significant impediment to
United States export sales. 113 The present tradeoff between export
sales lost to foreign governments and protected domestic sales
could be upset, however, by the Depariment of Defense with the
addition of reciprocal memoranda of understanding.1 14
"' The apparent advantage enjoyed by foreign firms was a key concern of the heavy
electrical equipment industry, which supported passage of the Agreement to help eliminate
the subsidization of low-priced imports with profits derived from high prices in protected.
home markets. See Pomeranz, supra note 24, at 1270.
"I See notes 79-81 supra.
"3' See notes 82 & 83 supra.
11 Under proposed changes to Defense Acquisition Regulations, Buy-American protec-
tion would no longer apply to purchases from allies supporting the NATO Rationalization,
Standardization and Interquality program in an off-set memorandum. See Proposed Revi-
sion to Defense Acquisition Regulation, Part 14, "Purchases From Participating Countries,"
785 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) A-19 & D-1 (1979).
[Vol. 55:63
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS BusiNEss UNDER THE AGREEMENT ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT-FACTORS To CONSIDER IN A
CHANGED ENVIRONMENT
Considerations in the Nondefense Telecommunications Market
The effect of the Agreement on the United States nondefense
telecommunications environment will initially depend upon the
coverage which our trading partners will offer American suppliers
in return for the broad coverage which the United States will.
grant.115 The willingness of our trading partners to offer govern-
ment telecommunications purchases, with respect to offers of cov-
erage to United States products, has been disappointing.11 6 Japan
and the European Community, the principal foreign markets for
United States telecommunications products, have withheld major
purchases of large potential customers from the Act's purview.111
Moreover, many countries which are presently or potentially im-
portant telecommunications customers either are not parties to the
Agreement, or have not offered their telecommunications entities
for coverage. For example, Annex I lists no Mideast, Latin Ameri-
can, or African country as a signatory to the Agreement,11 8 except
for Nigeria, which has conditionally offered its telecommunications
purchases for coverage.11  Thus, absent bilateral agreements with
the United States, the Agreement will have no effect on trade bar-
riers which may exist in those countries.
In response to the disappointing offers from other parties, the
United States has withheld from coverage the purchases of speci-
fied government agencies,"20 several of which are significant pur-
chasers of telecommunications products.121 Given the small num-
211 See notes 116-22 infra.
116 Since the United States telecommunications market is essentially open, it was antic-
ipated that the Agreement would provide little incentive to our trading partners to open up
their procurement of telecommunications products to United States suppliers. H.R. REP.
No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1979).
27 Although the European Community has excluded the telecommunications portions
of their PTT's, this is not a total product exclusion. Certain central government agencies
such as interior or justice ministries are covered by the Agreement. The exclusion of the
PTT's was nonetheless disappointing. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 143, re-
printed in [1979] U.S. COD. CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 529.
118 See Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, Annex I.
119 Id.
120 See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 143, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 528.
1 The Automated Data and Telecommunications Service of the General Services Ad-
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ber of entities offered for coverage by foreign parties, the effect of
the Agreement on domestic telecommunications equipment compa-
nies that supply the United States Government may be varied.
Where the Buy-American Act remains applicable-for example in
purchases by government agencies withheld from coverage"'-
the Agreement will not affect the nondefense telecommunications
industry. Where, however, telecommunications equipment sales to
United States government agencies are covered by the Agreement,
the projected impact is uncertain. It is probable that domestic
equipment suppliers are at least technologically equal to foreign
suppliers. Thus, although a significant edge in pricing has been re-
moved, United States producers should be in a position to remain
competitive.
The impact of the Agreement on American telephone compa-
nies, operating with substantial overhead costs necessitated by
their public service roles, is less optimistic. These companies lease
and sell telecommunications equipment to government agencies in
connection with their telephone services. Under the Agreement,
the telephone companies must compete for United States Govern-
ment business with foreign interconnect firms which will be able to
bid not only without the burden of public utility overhead, but also
without the barrier of the Buy-American Act. Additionally, the
many hundreds of American telephone operating companies can-
not benefit from the potential opening of foreign markets, since
their sale or lease of equipment is only ancillary to their franchise
obligations to provide local, domestic telephone services.
While the Agreement may cause an adverse competitive effect
in the United States market, it appears to have provided little
countervailing benefit in export markets.123 Since most foreign
countries operate their telephone systems through government
owned or controlled entities, the deprivation to the United States
telecommunications suppliers resulting from the withl~olding of
purchases of those entities from the Agreement's coverage seems
clear.12' Even though Japan has offered to open a portion of its
ministration is a significant purchaser, yet it is not covered by the Agreement. Its 1980
allocation for telecommunications products and services totals approximately $807 million.
[1979] GSA ANNuAL REPORT 28.
122 See note 120 supra.
123 See note 116 supra.
124 It has been estimated that if the United States waived Buy-American protection for
all covered products, it would open to the competitive marketplace approximately $12.5 bil-
lion, while gaining access to approximately $20 billion. See Statements of Administrative
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telephone network, the offer falls short of the goals set by the
United States Administration. 125 Similarly, the EEC has given no-
tice that it will not consider opening the telecommunications
purchases of its PTT's until 1981, thereby precluding United
States companies access to the lucrative European business.126
Moreover, although the Agreement provides a general frame-
work for fair and open telecommunications procurement by foreign
government entities which are or will be covered by it,12 7 new for-
eign business opportunities may continue to be hampered by sig-
nificant trade barriers which exist in some telecommunications
markets. Illustrative of these barriers is the requirement for local
presence in the form of an investment, a licensing arrangement,
set-off procurement, or the use of local material and labor.1 28 Al-
though it is difficult to view such requirements as nondiscrimina-
tory, the Agreement's provisions that deal with qualifying a sup-
plier to participate in tendering procedures do not prohibit
them.1 29 In essence, the Agreement provides only that such re-
Action intended to implement the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, House Doc. No. 153, Part
II 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 1388, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 665. The
potential Japanese telecommunications equipment market itself has been estimated at over
$3 billion. See Hearings on Legislation Necessary to Implement the Multilateral Trade
Agreement Concluded in Geneva, Switzerland Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 72 (1979) (Statement of Am-
bassador Alonzo L. McDonald).
,25 The Comptroller General, for example, noted that "the U.S. government initially
hoped that the Japanese government would open a total of $8 to $10 billion and more re-
cently, $7.5 billion worth of procurement to bidding by foreign suppliers." Comptroller Gen-
eral Report, supra note 72, at 77 (footnotes omitted).
Recent discussions between Japan and the United States have not produced an accept-
able telecommunications offer by Japan. The United States has rejected Japan's latest pro-
posal for joint research and development projects for mainframe (switching) equipment,
presumably preferring that United States firms bid for contracts only after completion of
the research project. ELECTROmNc NEWS, Aug. 18, 1980, at 18, col. 1.
126 The likelihood that the PTT's will open their purchases by 1981 seems remote. See
note 117 supra. The American Electronics Association, in testimony before the Subcommit-
tee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, reported that the EC plan to inte-
grate could "potentially result in barriers to U.S. exports." See Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1979)
(Statement of Victor Ragosine).
127 See notes 4 & 9 supra.
128 See note 82 supra.
22 The Agreement suggests that an entity "should normally refrain from awarding con-
tracts on the condition that the supplier provide off-set procurement opportunities or simi-
lar conditions." Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, at art. V, para. 14
(h) (emphasis added). Notes to paragraph 14(h), however, allow developing countries to "re-
quire incorporation of domestic content, offset procurement, or transfer of technology as
criteria for award of contracts." Id., notes. Any such condition must, of course, be expressed
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quirements be published in adequate time for a supplier to initiate,
and, to the extent compatible with the efficient operation of the
procurement process, complete the qualification and submit a re-
sponsive tender.13 0 An entity that complies with the Agreement's
publication requirements may therefore continue to favor local
suppliers and thwart the Agreement's intended purpose.
Trade barriers erected by regional equipment standards re-
main a hinderance to American suppliers.113 Because such stan-
dards usually are based upon either the international standard or
upon a recognized national standard, their use is not prohibited by
the Agreement. The Agreement does, however, prohibit the appli-
cation or creation of standards to promote obstacles to trade.
13 2
Accordingly, a signatory party that believes standards are being so
designed would have a proper complaint.133
Given the inadequate telecommunications coverage granted
under the Agreement by major industrial countries, a view of the
methods by which the domestic telecommunications industry can
be assured of a quid pro quo becomes crucial. One method, of
course, rests with the Presidential authority to prohibit govern-
ment procurement from countries which neither are parties to the
Agreement nor provide appropriate reciprocal competitive oppor-
tunities to products of the United States or its suppliers.3 4 Use of
this method is particularly pertinent with respect to current entity
negotiations with Japan. 3 5 Although the prohibition provisions ad-
dress reciprocity in the general terms of "United States products,"
the Act does provide for the negotiation of industry-wide objec-
in the tender itself. See id. art. V, paras. 4 & 12(h).
,30 Id. at art. V, para. 2(a).
M' The Bell Standard is an American barrier to foreign imports. In the United States,
however, where the government does not own the telecommunications system, it appears
less likely that technical standards could be used systematically to atoid foreign
competition.
I" Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. IV, para. 1. The exis-
tence of regional standards in Europe has, to a major degree, thwarted attempts within the
EC to create a community-wide telecommunications market. See 1 ADL supra note 70 at
24; note 75 supra.
"3 See notes 53-57 supra.
3 19 U.S.C. § 2514(b) (Supp. HI 1979). The legislative history of the Act discusses this
section in terms of an expectation that the President will continuously and vigorously seek
to establish reciprocity in particular product sectors including telecommunications. See S.
REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 137, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
381, 522-23.
135 See note 125 supra.
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tives138 in the renegotiations scheduled to begin by January,
1984.137 The legislative history of the Act clearly establishes that
the telecommunications industry was intended to be included as a
subject for these sector renegotiations. 13 8 Not only should the tele-
communications industry monitor these negotiations to help pro-
tect its interests, but it should continue to inform the Executive
Branch of the industry's loss resulting from the refusal of most de-
veloped countries to allow the Agreement to cover the telecommu-
nications purchases of its PTT's. The President is required to re-
port to Congress on such refusals on or before July 1, 1981.113
In the entity negotiations with Japan, (the most important op-
portunity for increasing industry protection), in negotiations with
potential new parties, and in renegotiations with present parties, it
is critical that the United States emphasize both the quality and
quantity of telecommunications opportunities offered by foreign
entities.14 0 Access to tenders at the research and development stage
is of vital importance with respect to high cost central office
switching systems and transmission equipment purchases in Eu-
rope. Access to primary stage development contracts would allow
future bids on equipment built to a standard which United States
suppliers subsequently could include in their product planning.1 4 1
The importance of early participation is emphasized by the Agree-
ment itself, which allows single tendering by an original supplier
for equipment replacements or for extensions when a change of
supplier would compel the purchase of equipment which is not in-
terchangeable with existing equipment.142 The Agreement further
stresses the importance of ground-floor participation by allowing
an entity to use single tendering to purchase prototypes and first
136 19 U.S.C. § 2514(a) (Supp. I1 1979); Agreement on Government Procurement,
supra note 11, art. V, para. 15(d).
"I The Act provides that if the President determines that expansion in the coverage
granted by entities of developed countries, which are principal purchasers on appropriate
product sectors, is not likely to occur within 12 months from the start of the renegotiations,
he shall report that determination to Congress together with "appropriate actions to seek
reciprocity in such product sectors .... ." 19 U.S.C. § 2514(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1979).
138 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 137, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Naws 381, 523.
139 19 U.S.C. § 2515(c) (Supp. 11 1979).
11 The Act requires that the United States be given "appropriate reciprocal competi-
tive government procurement opportunities." 19 U.S.C. § 2512(a) (Supp. M 1979). Presum-
ably, this standard includes both quality and quantity.
14 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. V, para. 15(e).
142 Id. (d).
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products developed at its request in the course of a particular con-
tract for research or development. 43
Finally, sales of low-cost volume items to foreign governments
could be profitable for United States suppliers. Since foreign
PABX, interconnect, and subscriber products already compete in
the United States, United States products should be afforded the
reciprocal opportunity to compete for foreign PTT business.
Considerations in the Defense Telecommunications Industry
The Department of Defense is the largest customer for defense
telecommunications. '4 Since most of the telecommunications
purchases of the DOD come within the national security exclusion,
the Agreement should not have an adverse impact on the defense
communications industry.145 While Annex I lists certain telecom-
munications products as not "generally" covered due to the na-,
tional security exclusion,146 however, the use of "generally" could
be interpreted to give ad hoc leeway to contract officers to limit
the list of excluded items. Such an interpretation should be made
only when the public interest is clearly served. Private sector mon-
itoring is the primary method of assuring that the United States
maintains its own strong, secure defense telecommunications
system.147
The growing utilization of reciprocal memoranda of under-
standing may also play an important role in the future. Although
memoranda are negotiated outside the Agreement, it clearly recog-
nizes their existence.148 By allowing the President to authorize the
14' Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, art. V, para. 15(e).
"' See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
241 The Industry Sector Advisory Committee encompassing communications equipment
(ISAC #22) stated in the conclusion of its report to the Senate Finance Committee on the
Agreement-
This ISAC recognizes a legitimate concern on the part of all countries that
they maintain a strong internal telecommunications design and manufacturing ca-
pability. Therefore, we endorse and strongly support the exclusion of departments
of defense telecommunications from the Government Procurement Code on the
grounds of national security of the signatories to the treaty, and recommend that
all telecommunications systems, equipment and components be excluded from
coverage of the Code except upon the basis of bilateral negotiations.
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, PRIVATE ADvISORY COMMITrEE REPORTS ON THE TOKYO ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TaADE NEGOTIATIONS 449, 458 (Committee Print 1979).
146 Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 11, Annex I.
"4 Id. art. V, para. 16.
.48 19 U.S.C. § 2512(b)(3) (Supp. 1979).
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Secretary of Defense to waive a purchasing prohibition in favor of
any country which enters into a reciprocal purchasing agreement
with the DOD,149 the Act seemingly supports the memoranda effort
of the Department and emphasizes the need for the defense com-
munications equipment sector to monitor this process.
CONCLUSION
The Agreement on Government Procurement could provide
many United States suppliers with a net gain in customers and
profits, since the vast United States nongovernment telecommuni-
cations equipment market is already open to foreign suppliers,
while major export markets could offer lucrative long-term oppor-
tunities. The degree of benefit to be derived by the telecommuni-
cations industry, however, will depend upon skillful negotiations
with Japan (which could continue until the Act's January 1, 1981
C effective date) and upon renegotiations with the European Com-
munity. Also, the effectiveness must be preserved through the judi-
cious use of designations of eligibility, and resolute application of
the prohibition to induce reciprocity and to encourage additional
countries to become parties to the Agreement. In the defense mar-
ket, furthermore, industry members must monitor Department of
Defense memoranda 50 and other reciprocal purchase arrange-
ments, to guarantee that more defense telecommunications work is
not given away than taken in. Most importantly, Congress, the De-
partment of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representa-
tive must continue their vigil to ensure that trade liberalization
does not become a mere catchphrase, and that a domestic industry,
such as telecommunications equipment, is not threatened by the
offering of a procurement opportunity without reciprocation by our
trading partners.
24 Id.
150 See Hearings on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations Concluded in Geneva, Swit-
zerland Before The Government Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 56, 68 (1979) (Statement of J. H. Lasley, Chairman of ISAC-22). The pri-
vate sector has stressed the importance of monitoring the MOU process to help assure that
United States suppliers receive reciprocity for prime contract offsets. Such monitoring is
especially important given the potpourri of subcontracts that may be setoff for United
States allies under NATO programs and for which Buy-American protection may be waived.
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